Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 61 | Issue 5

1-1-1986

Government Enforcement of Section Two
Donald I. Baker

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Donald I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section Two, 61 Notre Dame L. Rev. 898 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol61/iss5/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

Article 2

Government Enforcement of Section Two
Donald L Baker*
The Antitrust Division of the Justice Department is very different from "a private attorney general" and quite different from the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC). These differences are readily
apparent in enforcement of section 2 of the Sherman Act as it has
emerged over the years.' A private plaintiff must be primarily interested in winning the case at bar, regardless of the principles necessary to do so. The government, as civil plaintiff, must be concerned
about the impact of its case on the economy as a whole; therefore, it
must be concerned about both the legal principles involved in the
case and the perception of the case in the bar and business
community.
In the monopolization area, the government enforcement
agencies tend to be dealing with proven market success. They
therefore must be especially concerned that they neither punish
success for its own sake 2 nor be perceived as doing so. In addition,
a major monopolization case has the special problem of being a
front-page news event, and thus, an appropriate subject for random
political controversy.
The government's "success" in section 2 enforcement must be
measured in terms of (1) the effectiveness of the relief actually obtained, especially in major structural cases; (2) the legal principles
that the government has helped to establish; and, ultimately, (3) the
government's ability to deter monopolistic activities by dominant
firms, without chilling competitive vigor.
Section 2 enforcement in fact has been a "mixed bag" for the
government. The Antitrust Division has won some famous cases in
3
which little effective relief was obtained (such as Alcoa ); lost some
*
Partner, Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan, Washington, D.C. Mr. Baker served as Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division of the United States Department ofJustice
from 1976 to 1977.
1 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) does not enforce § 2 (15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982))
directly, but rather § 2 principles govern the FTC's enforcement efforts against monopolists and would-be monopolists under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C.
§ 45 (1982)). See Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981). The FTC has been a fairly marginal player (when compared
with the Antitrust Division) in developing § 2 jurisprudence. See In re E. I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 653 (1980) (DnPont-Titanium Dioxide).
2 Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945) (Alcoa).
See also text accompanying notes 35-49 infra; and DuPont-Titaninm Dioxide, note 1 supra.
3 See Alcoa, note 2 supra.
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cases that it should have won (such as DuPont-Cellophane4 and Empire
Gas5 ); won some cases that it should have lost (such as Grinnell6);
brought some cases it probably would wish to forget (such as
IBM 7 ); and even won some splendid little victories (such as Lorain
Journal8 and Otter Tail 9 ) which moved the law forward.
The two "really big" section 2 wins for the government are
separated widely by time and circumstances: the Standard Oil victory'0 came in the Supreme Court in 1911 after a long litigation;
the AT&T "victory" 1 ' in 1982 came by consent after long litigation
but before final judgment by any court.' 2 Each case transformed
the industrial landscape in a key sector of the economy.
The Antitrust Division has achieved its section 2 record at a
great cost. Section 2 cases tend to be staff-consuming, expensive,
and seemingly endless.13 A single, large, section 2 case tends to
take on a life of its own-a life of intensive, complex combat of
precise details which may only be vaguely understood by the senior
"warlords" on either side. In part, this is because a major monopolization case goes on for so long that it tends to span the terms of
several administrations in the government and survive even major
4
management changes at the defendant company.'
This article is concerned with the legal rules which the Justice
4 United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (DuPont-Cellophane). The product market definition analysis seems seriously flawed because it did not
respond to the defendant's pricing strategy. See text accompanying notes 47-49 infra.
5 United States v. Empire Gas Corp., 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1122 (1977).
6 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). While the "conduct" or "exclusionary intent" aspect of the decision may be correct, the market definition aspect of the
case is not. See text accompanying notes 53-64 infra.
7 United States v. IBM Corp., Civ. Action No. 169-Civ.-200 (S.D.N.Y. 1969-82) (discussed in text accompanying notes 65-79 infra). See note 13 infra.
8 Lorainjournal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
9 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
10 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). This case, brought under both
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, is a landmark in the development of the rule of reason.
11 United States v. Western Electric Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,900 (D.D.C.
1982) (modification of final judgment). See text accompanying notes 80-98 infra.
12 The government did win some important victories along the way. See, e.g., United
States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981) (rejecting AT&T's motion for dismissal at close of government's case).
13 To take an extreme example, the case of United States v. IBM Corp., which lasted
from 1969 until 1982, see note 7 supra, spanned the terms of five Presidents, nine Attorney
Generals, and seven Assistant Attorney Generals in charge of the Antitrust Division. By
chance, the Assistant Attorney General who filed the case (Edwin Zimmerman) and the one
who disposed of it (William Baxter) were each on leave from the Stanford Law School when
they acted. Meanwhile, at IBM only five members of its twenty-four member Board of Directors at the time the case ended had been on the Board at the time it was filed. Professor
(nowJudge) Robert Bork nicely labeled the IBM case as "the Antitrust Division's Vietnam."
R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978).

14

See note 13 supra.
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Department has established in section 2 cases and with the relief it
has actually obtained. Parts I and II deal with the legal rules and
question the clarity and deterrent effect of many of the decided
cases. Part III analyzes the government's modern structural relief
cases (Grinnell, IBM, and AT&T). Part IV focuses on the modern
conduct-oriented injunctive cases (Otter Tail, Empire Gas, and American Airlines). In Part V, I attempt at look to the future of section 2
enforcement in the post-Reagan world.
I. Enforcement Efficiency and Legal Deterrence
There are two main aspects of section 2 as a government enforcement weapon. The first is structural: Section 2 offers a means
of breaking up existing monopoly power whenever that power can
be traced to past mergers or anticompetitive conduct but not to the
classic economic virtues of skill, foresight, and industry. The second is regulatory: Section 2 offers a means of restraining abusive
conduct of firms who have or seek monopoly power. The first generally looks to divestiture as the clearest way of dealing with the
situation, while the second looks to injunctive orders. Seeing this
dichotomy between divestiture and injunction is vital if we are to
understand the potential for government section 2 enforcement,
particularly at a time when antitrust law enforcement is being conducted with much-reduced government resources.
Law in general, and antitrust law in particular, tend to be most
effective when they focus on particular conduct and its effects-for
then, individual cases can produce useful rules which give general
guidance. This clearly can be seen by examining government equity cases brought under the anti-restraint rules of Sherman Act
section 115 and the anti-merger rules of Clayton Act section 7.16
Often the government's principal reason for bringing such a
civil antitrust case, and even more often for appealing one, is to
establish a particular rule for use against others. This is hardly surprising. Since the government is generally seeking only equitable
relief, it is not driven by the prospect of treble damages and attorneys' fees. The government is thus entirely different from almost
any private plaintiff in that it has an institutional interest in particular legal rules.
A rule established in one case can significantly influence the
private conduct of nonparties, but only where the analogously situated firm has an effective choice among practical alternatives.
Choice is generally present for those involved with distribution
practices, proposed mergers, or joint ventures, where antitrust ad15
16

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
15 U.S.C. § 19 (1982).
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vice is generally given in advance. By contrast, the entrenched monopolist-especially one with a history of mergers-has few
practical choices when faced with the risk of a potential divestiture
action. Its market power is just as much a fundamental fact of life
for it as it is for the government. A successful government section 2
action which breaks up another monopolist will not change this reality. All a potential defendant can do is to wait warily, behave quietly, and pray.
Even if the government actually sues for divestiture, such a defendant generally will treat the case as charging a "capital offense"
and feel that it has little choice but to stand its ground and fight.
Thus, a section 2 divestiture case is very likely to be a legal Ver17
dun-a large-scale, hard-fought, slow, and expensive combat.
Each case has a very low pay-off beyond its own four corners. 18
Thus, the government agency, if it is behaving rationally,
must justify the enforcement costs of a section 2 structure case by
improved economic performance in the relevant market alone. The
agency can do this in a major, growing national industry, but not in
a highly localized, monopoly situation. To illustrate, take Phillipsburg, NewJersey-the scene of a famous little antitrust battle in the
late 1960s.19
17 History makes clear that any incentives for expediting government monopolization
cases are generally inadequate. The government staff wishes to win and, to that end, to
develop every piece of possibly helpful evidence. Meanwhile, the defendant generally
wishes to put off the day of reckoning; so long as their client is willing to pay for it, the
defendant's counsel have every incentive to make the case big and slow.
History does reveal one arguable exception in the monopolization area. During the
mid-1970s, the Antitrust Division tried several hard-fought electric power monopolization
cases before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its predecessor as part of the
nuclear licensing process. See, e.g., Consumers Power Co., Midland Units 1 and 2, NRC
Docket Nos. 50-329A, 50-330A (1975); Alabama Power Co., Jos. M. Farley Units 1 and 2,
NRC Docket Nos. 50-348A, 50-364A (1977); Toledo Edison Co., Davis Besse Units 1, 2,
and 3, NRC Docket Nos. 50-364A, 50-500A, 50-501A, Perry Units 1 and 2, NRC Docket
Nos. 50-440A, 50-441A (1977). They were tried under a statutory standard which required
the NRC to deny a license if the addition of the nuclear plant would "create or maintain a
situation inconsistent with the antitrust laws." Each involved an antitrust challenge to complex power pooling and supply arrangements, and was the full equivalent of § 2 monopolization cases tried under the principles established in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,
410 U.S. 366 (1973). Toledo Edison yielded a 264-page decision based on an 87-day trial.
Even so, these cases went fairly fast by § 2 standards. The utility had a key incentive to
expedite matters: Under the statute, it could not operate a nuclear plant until all the antitrust issues had been settled.
18 Rational behavior is not a unitary concept for the government. The staff lawyers
handling a particular case or investigation may sometimes be perfectly prepared to undertake a massive effort without making any real cost-benefit analysis, especially when they
think they can win against some defendant which they do not like. The whole affair can take
on a proprietary quality for the staff who are largely free from the costs (even if not the
inconvenience) of prosecuting the particular case. Case selection and general deployment
of staff resources obviously concern senior supervisors who are necessarily concerned
about the drain which every case places on the agency's finite resources.
19 United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 306 F. Supp. 645 (D.N.J. 1969),
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It may make sense for the Antitrust Division to try such a local
bank merger case and carry it all the way to the Supreme Court
because the Phillipsburgrule can be applied to similar mergers in a
thousand other Phillipsburgs across the country. This is the only
meaningful payoff for all of the government's efforts. But no such
payoff would occur from a monopolization case in a Phillipsburg
which seeks major divestiture: Any small-town bank monopolist
elsewhere could just sit tight and hope that lightning would not
strike a second time.
The government can achieve a stronger precedential effect
when it successfully uses section 2 to attack dominant firm conduct
likely to recur elsewhere in the economy. Otter Tail 20 offers an excellent example. In this case, a relatively small electric power company in Minnesota, with a regional transmission monopoly, used
various tactics to deter various local communities from switching to
municipally-owned power systems or to punish them for doing so.
The battle raged around various small Minnesota communities of
the "Lake Wobegon" variety, 21 places that would make Phillipsburg 22 seem positively metropolitan by contrast. Some of Otter
Tail's tactics (including refusals to sell wholesale power or to
"wheel" power across its system) were not uncommon in the electric utility industry.
Thus, both the basic substantive principles and the injunctive
relief established by the Justice Department in Otter Tail came to be
widely used in the electric power industry, both by the Department
itself 2 3 and even more by private litigants. 2 4 Otter Tail principles
have also applied to monopoly utilities in other fields. 2 5
rev'd, 399 U.S. 350 (1970) (Supreme Court's decision invalidated a merger between the two
largest banks in a small three-bank community in northwestern NewJersey, closed by law to
de novo entry from outside competitors; the two merging banks together had $25.3 million
in deposits).
20 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). See text accompanying
notes 102-1 linfra.
21 See generally G. KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1985); Lonesome Whistle Blowing, Time,
November 4, 1985, at 68 (cover entitled "Let's Hear it for Lake Wobegon"). The principal
battlefields included Elbow Lake, Minn. (population 1484 in 1970) and Hankinston, N.D.
(population 1125 in 1970).
22 1970 population: 17,849. Phillipsburg was part of the Bethlehem-Allentown-Easton
standard metropolitan area. See Phillipsburg,399 U.S. at 354-55.
23 See note 17 supra (discussing use of Otter Tail principles in the nuclear licensing
context).
24 See, e.g., City of Mishawaka v. American Elec. Power Co., 465 F. Supp. 1320 (N.D.
Ind. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 616 F.2d 976 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1096
(1981). But cf. Town of Messena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
(CCH)

63,526 (N.D.N.Y. 1980) (no § 2 violation when monopoly power company refused

to "wheel" power at unreasonable terms proposed by town).
25 See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983), and cases discussed in Baker & Baker, Antitrust and Communications Deregulation, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 21-27 (1983).
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II.

The Problem of Vague Rules

The deterence-by-precedents issue cuts much more deeply
than just the "structural relief versus conduct relief" dichotomy. It
goes to the basic question of whether government section 2 enforcement provides a coherent and economically-rational legal
message for a dominant firm to use in planning its conduct. The
fairest answer is "sometimes yes, sometimes no."
The confusion is compounded by the fact that antitrust law and
policy reflect two broad but distinct themes. One is a populist concern about entrepreneurial independence and equality-a concern
about the danger of the large and powerful squeezing out the small
and worthy. The other is a concern about economic efficiency, or, as
the Supreme Court said in 1975, "competition based on efficiency." 2 6 Cost-cutting and innovation are at the heart of this
interest.
The populist strain was the stronger one historically-and was
particularly strong among the judges who decided key government
section 2 cases (including Judges Hand and Wyzanski and Justice
Douglas). These jurists tended to assume that a monopoly was per
se evil and that, therefore, the crucial question was whether the defendant was an "innocent worthy" which had acquired its place by
skill or luck. The "competition based on efficiency" approach has
been ascendent since the early 1970s and it is now clearly the dominant view. This analysis encourages vigorous competition by every
firm-large and small-and will generally insist on a more rigorous
showing that a successful monopolist's actions were anticompetitive
in intent or effect. 27 Because contemporary judges and prosecutors
are likely to be more tolerant toward aggressive monopolists than
the classic government section 2 cases would imply, these famous
landmarks do complicate life today. This is not the government's
fault; it is just part of the net reckoning of government section 2
enforcement.
The Justice Department's efforts in the Grinnell case 28 did at
least give rise to the hornbook definition of single firm monopolization. Justice Douglas, writing for the Supreme Court in 1966,
stated:
The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two
elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant
market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that
power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
26 Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 621 (1975).
27 See note 49 infra.
28 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
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accident. 2 9
Both elements of the test are difficult to apply and courts have applied them unevenly in practice.
The first element in the offense-possession of monopoly
30
powr-is "the power to control prices or exclude competition."
The existence of such power is usually proved by showing that the
defendant possesses the "predominant share" of what is likely to be
the narrowest market which the plaintiff can establish. 3 1 Calculating
market shares is of course easy; defining "the relevant market" has
not been, and massive market definition battles have plagued section 2 cases. There has also been much speculation as to what
"minimum market share" suffices, 32 but in fact the defendants'
market shares have been high in all the main monopolization cases
33
which the government has brought and won since Alcoa.
The second element of the offense-willful acquisition or
maintenance of monopoly power-is much, much harder to master
conceptually and to prove in fact. In 1970, a distinguished commentator suggested that "the offense [of monopolization] lies in
conduct which reveals that the firm likes to have and means to keep
its power." 34 Yet, this is too narrow a rule in today's terms, since
we would not wish to punish the firm that "means to keep its
power" by being more efficient than anyone else in the market. In any
event, drawing the actual line between conduct which is "honestly
industrial" on one hand, and that which is "exclusionary" or "willful" on the other, falls somewhere in the spectrum between "hard"
and "impossible"-and always runs the risk of penalizing success
for its own sake.
The great landmarks established by the Justice Department are
not particularly helpful in providing precise guidance as to what is
acceptable conduct for the dominant firm. These cases tend to be
either ambiguous or obvious in their teaching. In Alcoa itself, the
defendant was found to have prevented others from entering the
market by continually expanding capacity in anticipation of in29 Id. at 570-71.
30 DuPont-Cellophane, 351 U.S. at 391.
31 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571.
32 In Alcoa, Judge Hand held that although over 90% of the relevant market "is enough
to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be
enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not." United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945).
33 The share was 87% in Grinnell;75-85% in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp.,
110 F. Supp. 295, 339 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); and 68-80% in
American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 797 (1946). It may have been 100%
(of the regional transmission market) in Otter Tail.
34 See A. NEALE, THE ANTrrRUST LAws OF THE U.S.A. 445 (2d ed. 1970).
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creased demand.3 5 Judge Hand specifically declined to "interpret
'exclusion' as limited to maneuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent competition" because to do so
would be to "emasculate the Act." 3 6 In Griffith 3 7 and Schine Thea-

tres, 38 the defendants used the combined purchasing power of a
whole theatre circuit, covering both "monopoly" and "open"
towns to obtain preferential contract terms not available to their
competitors in "open" towns. In American Tobacco,3 9 the defendants
purchased cheaper grades of tobacco not suitable for their own cigarettes and at trial were unable to negate the government's suggested inference that these purchases were made to raise costs for
competing manufacturers of cheaper cigarettes. In United Shoe Machinery,40 the defendant refused to make its larger, more complex
equipment available except on a lease. In Grinnell,4 1 the defendant
achieved its position by acquiring companies that had previously
entered into a series of market and product division agreements. In
Otter Tail,42 as mentioned above, 43 the defendant refused to supply
bulk wholesale power or transmission service to unintegrated local
distribution systems with which the defendant "competed" at retail.
The Alcoa case in fact presents a potentially perverse message.
Alcoa was found liable because it had aggressively promoted the
use of aluminum, a relatively new metal on which it had early patents, by maintaining low profit margins and continuously expanding capacity. 44 What Judge Hand found was that Alcoa was
not "the passive beneficiary of a monopoly" (of 90% of the market)
and that it therefore did not fall "within the exception established
in favor of those who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the control of
the market." 45 The distinguished (but populist) jurist recognized
that Alcoa had "stimulated demand and opened new uses for the
metal, but not without making sure that it could supply what it had
evoked."46 For this Alcoa was found liable. Yet, in layman's terms,
Alcoa seemed to have done what we ask of a competitor in a com35 148 F.2d at 430.
36 Id. at 431.
37 United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
38 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
39 American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
40 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'dper
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
41 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd (except as to
relief), 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
42 Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
43 See text accompanying notes 20-25 supra.
44 148 F.2d at 431-32.
45 Id. at 430-3 1.
46 Id. at 430.
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petitive market-keep prices and profits down, stimulate demand,
and be there ready to meet that demand on reasonable terms.
Alcoa becomes even more troubling intellectually when contrasted with the Justice Department's DuPont-Cellophane case 47
against DuPont a decade later. There the government challenged
DuPont's alleged monopoly position in cellophane and moistureproof cellophane-products in which DuPont had obtained important early patent rights and clearly continued to dominate. DuPont
priced its product rather high, earning very large returns (especially
as compared with Alcoa's); and, by its high prices, DuPont enhanced demand for less perfect substitutes for many cellophane
uses. 48
In the end, DuPont persuaded the Supreme Court that the relevant market was not "cellophane," in which it had such a high
market percentage, but "flexible packaging materials," where its
market share was less than 25%. The net result was that Alcoa was
punished for low prices, low profits, and expansiveness, while DuPont escaped liability though it had monopolisticly priced its premium product.
Taken together, Alcoa and DuPont-Cellophane seem to counsel a
dominant firm to keep its prices up, not to be too vigorous or expansive, and to make room for less desirable substitutes and less
efficient competitors. Such a message has to be considered both
perverse and wrong.
The net result is that the Justice Department has produced
fairly little law which seriously helps leading firms by providing guidance on permissible conduct under section 2. Moreover, the government as litigant freely uses Alcoa in briefs and oral arguments (as
any vigorous litigant would) and thereby has helped to perpetrate
the confusion. Thus, under section 2, we really need to look instead to a modern line of decisions by several courts of appeals in
private cases-mostly involving IBM and AT&T-which have
sought to refine out the vagueness of the Alcoa standard and provide some meaningful guidance to dominant businesses. 49
47 United States v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (DuPontCellophane).
48 See Stocking & Mueller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, 45 AM. ECON. REV.
29 (1955).
49 See ANTrrRUST LAw DEVELOPMENTS (SECOND) 121-30 (1983). The treatise discusses

cases such as MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 698 F.2d 1377 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 955 (1983); William Inglis & Sons Baking Co. v. ITT Continental
Baking Co., 668 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1981); Northeastern Tel. Co. v.AT&T Co., 651 F.2d

76 (2d Cir. 1981); California Computer Prod., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir.
1979); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
430 U.S. 1093 (1980); Pacific Eng'g & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th

Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977). See also Baker, "Berkey, CalComp Cases Support Innova-
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The Justice Department's Modem Structural Relief Cases

During the past quarter century, the Antitrust Division has
brought and litigated three significant section 2 cases seeking substantial structural relief. United States v. Grinnell Corp.5 0 was filed in
1961, won by the government in the district court in 1964, and affirmed by the Supreme Court in 1966. United States v. IBM Corp.51
was filed in 1969, went to trial in 1975, and was abandoned by the
government in 1982. United States v. AT&T Co. 5 2 was filed in 1974,
went to trial in early 1980, and was settled with AT&T's substantial
divestiture in 1982. Each case proved to be very different from the
others and each case influenced how the others were handled by
the government.
A.

United States v. Grinnell Corp. (1961-1966)53

Grinnell was the last of the "old order." By chance, it was tried
by the same energetic district judge (Charles Wyzanski) who had, a
decade earlier, tried the government's last major section 2 win,
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. ;54 and it was affirmed on
appeal by Justice Douglas, a solid and consistent champion of populist antitrust rules. For both, it was "an easy case."
Judge Wyzanski started his analysis in Grinnell from two related
premises: First, section 2 litigation was potentially endless; second,
monopoly is presumptively evil. This led Judge Wyzanski, the Justice Department, and, ultimately, the Supreme Court to the same
conclusion: it is sufficient for the government to prove that the defendants (1) controlled a very high share of a plausible market, and
(2) had engaged in enough "bad acts" to bar any inference that
"their proportion of the market is a mere tribute to their perfect
performance." 55 Having done this, the government was then presumptively entitled to broad structural relief because monopoly was
bad and breaking up anything but a perfectly innocent monopoly
was therefore good. This perspective is relevant, not only because
it won for the government in Grinnell, but also because it fundamentally influenced the Justice Department's subsequent prosecution
against IBM. 56
lion by Dominant Enterprise," Nat'l L. J., Sept. 9, 1979, at 22 (discussing especially Berkey
Photo, Inc. and California Computer Products).
50 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
51 Civ. Act. No. 69-Civ.-200 (S.D.N.Y. 1969-82).
52 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981).
53 236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd (except as to relief), 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
54 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). Grinnell was
filed in Rhode Island but the districtjudges in Rhode Island were all disqualified andJudge
Wyzanski was assigned by the First Circuit to handle the case.
55 236 F. Supp. at 255.
56 See Part III, Section A infra.
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In Grinnell, the facts were not too complicated and Judge
Wyzanski worked hard to make sure that the trial did not become
too complicated. Indeed, the case took only three years and seven
57
months from complaint to final judgment in the district court.
The defendant, Grinnell, which was a manufacturer of sprinkler systems and other protection equipment, had acquired three major
competitors in the fire, burglary, and water flow alarm businessescompanies which provided, among other things, service from central stations in particular cities. For many years prior to their acquisition by Grinnell, the acquired companies had engaged in a series
of geographic and product market allocation agreements-clear
per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act, but violations on
which the statute of limitations had long since run. This history,
plus a series of mergers (including Grinnell's acquisition of the
three competing companies), were clearly enough to establish "intent" or "deliberateness" so far as Judge Wyzanski was
58
concerned.
The definition of the market which Grinnell was supposed to
have monopolized was much more hotly contested. The Antitrust
Division alleged, and the district court found, that there was a national market for a product called "accredited central station pro57 The expeditious trial process was described by Judge Wyzanski as follows:
Complaint, seeking relief under § 4 of the Sherman Act [26 Stat. 209, 15
U.S.C. § 4], was filed April 13, 1961. Extensive pre-trial discovery and frequent
pre-trial conferences with the Court, and, above all, the co-operation of informed,
industrious, and experienced lawyers, who jointly took 128 depositions (totalling
over 8,000 pages), to a large extent disclosed to each other proposed exhibits,
entered into 5 stipulations, (totalling 58 pages), and exchanged careful, thorough,
pre-trial briefs (in excess of 400 pages), enabled the parties at the outset of the
trial to lay before the Court 1181 exhibits comprising approximately 15,000 pages.
The preliminary procedural and substantive steps reduced the taking of testimony in
open Court to six days, fromJune 15, 1964 to June 24, 1964. The Court, at the conclu-

sion of the testimony, required each party to use the summer recess to limit to 40
pages the principal portion of its brief, with a right to annex appendices of unlimited length. Oral arguments upon those briefs and replies thereto took place on
October 9, 1964.
236 F. Supp. at 246-47 (emphasis added). The district court's decision was handed down
on November 27, 1964. The oral argument in the Supreme Court was on March 28-29,
1966, and the case was decided onJune 13, 1966.
58 Judge Wyzanski in fact went further, suggesting that, once the government had
shown the defendant had a monopoly market share, the burden should be placed on the
defendant to show this monopoly position had been thrust on him by his own skill, foresight, and industry. 236 F. Supp. at 248 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)). This was, Judge Wyzanski added, likely to be "the highly exceptional case, a rara avis more often found in academic groves than in the thickets of business." Id. Even at the height of the Warren Court era, the Supreme Court declined to
reach this issue. 384 U.S. at 576 n.7. The Court simply indicated that "the record clearly
shows that this monopoly power was consciously acquired" and hence Judge Wyzanski's
proposition was not necessary to decide the case. Id. Today's Supreme Court would be
highly unlikely to supportJudge Wyzanski's proposition, even if someone urged it to do so.
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tection service"-a market in which Grinnell's subsidiaries
conveniently had eighty-seven percent 59 The market (the existence
of which was affirmed by a divided Supreme Court) was almost certainly fictitious. First, it was not a national market but a series of
fairly small regional or metropolitan markets-many of which must
have been natural monopolies. 60 Second, the cross-elasticities between "accredited central station protection service" and other
forms of protection service seemed fairly strong, even on the record developed in the case. 6 1 Justice Fortas' dramatic dissent characterized the whole exercise as "a studied failure to assess the effect
of defendants' position and practices in the light of the competition
which exists" 62 and lambasted the majority for approving "this
strange
red-haired,
bearded, one-eyed
man-with-a-limp
classification."63

The district court had ordered some divestiture and the
Supreme Court ordered more, particularly emphasizing the importance of divestiture in markets which were large enough to support
64
more than one central service protection operation.
B.

United States v. IBM Corp. (1969-1982)65

Two and a half years after its Supreme Court victory in Grinnell,
the Antitrust Division launched its next major section 2 war. The
government's complaint, filed three days before the end of the
Johnson Administration in January 1969, charged IBM with monopolizing the market for "general purpose digital computers" by
pursuing a variety of aggressive tactics.6 6 These included: (1) bundling hardware and software together, (2) introducing so-called
"fighting machines," with low prices and profits, aimed at "seg59 236 F. Supp. at 254.
60 A natural monopoly is simply a market in which production costs continue to fall
over all years of potential demand. Such markets are normally characterized by heavy capital investment and large scale economies.
61 Thus, Judge Wyzanski found:
Defendant alarm companies do not have unfeddered power to control the
price of their services. Even where they have no competition from other CSPS
companies, they have not always been able to receive the standard [rates] they
have set for themselves ... or annual service charges. This is due to the fringe
competition of other alarm or watchmen services.
236 F. Supp. at 254.
62 384 U.S. at 589 (FortasJ., dissenting).
63 Id. at 591.
64 Judge Wyzanski had entered a variety of other injunctions-including a novel one
barring any of the defendants from employing Grinnell's chief executive officer. 236 F.
Supp. at 259-60. TheJustice Department did not resist the defendants' appeal on the latter
point and the Supreme Court dropped it as "unduly harsh and quite unnecessary on this
record." 384 U.S. at 579.
65 Civ. Act. No. 69-Civ.-200 (filed January 17, 1969).
66 Complaint
20-21.
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ments of the market where competitors had or appeared likely to
have unusual competitive success," (3) announcing production
schedules on so-called "phantom machines" to delay prospective
customers from signing up with competitors, and (4) "granting exceptional discriminating allowances in favor of universities and
other educational institutions. "67 Thus, the government charged
that IBM "pursued a manufacturing and marketing policy that has
prevented competing manufacturers . .. from having an adequate
opportunity effectively to compete for business in the general pur68
pose digital computer market."
The government's IBM case was "better" than Grinnell in that
the core product market was reasonably plausible (even if not incontestable) based on the technology of 1969; and IBM's share of the
"market" was clearly over 65%.69 Unfortunately for the government, its evidence on exclusionary conduct was more ambiguous,
or at least more complex, than was the case in Grinnell; the market
context was dynamic and constantly changing; and district judge
David Edelstein was no Charles Wyzanski.
In the end, the IBM case proved all too much like World
War 1.70 The Antitrust Division had done a very extensive pre-complaint investigation and no doubt expected that it would win this
one within a reasonable time period. Just as the Franco-Prussian
War proved a poor predictor of what war would be like on the
Western Front, so did Grinnell prove a poor predictor of what
would follow in the United States Courthouse on Foley Square in
New York. The IBM battle raged on an unprecedented scale-with
legions of lawyers, economists, and support staff on each side-and
was characterized by a level of acrimony and arrogance which was
at least new to my experience. Everything was disputed; virtually
nothing was stipulated.
After six years of discovery and skirmishing, the trial actually
began in May, 1975. Judge Wyzanski had disposed of Grinnell after
six days of testimony. IBM, by contrast, would still be occupying
the courtroom after six years.
The delay was fatal to the Antitrust Division. By even the mid1970s, it was clear that the case was a relic. It was a hard fought
battle over the market and marketing practices of the 1960s, viewed
against the background of the very different computer industry of
the 1970s (with powerful small machines displacing big mainframes
67 Id. at 20.
68 Id. (emphasis added).
69 Transamerica Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 1979-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 62,989
(1979).
70 See B. TUCHMAN, THE GUNS OF AUGUST chapter 3 (1962) (describing both sides'
overly optimistic expectations at the outset of the war).
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in many applications), and looking to relief in the late 1980s or
even 1990s. The only practical relief the Antitrust Division staff
could even contemplate in such a changing and unpredictable
world was breaking up IBM-and that was their unflinching goal as
Nixon gave way to Ford, who lost to Carter, who in turn lost to
Reagan. The pages of transcripts and exhibits piled up, but nobody
seemed closer to victory. The case simply became unwieldy beyond
anyone's worst expectations of antitrust nightmare. Even a philosopher-king would have had immense difficulty in dealing with the
massive tangle of evidence that had been assembled before Judge
Edelstein for almost seven years.
Ultimately, of course, in 1981-1982, Assistant Attorney General William Baxter devoted the intellect and effort which the government needed to employ in order to come to grips with the case.
He then quite rightly disposed of it by dismissal. Cost and delay
clearly figured in Professor Baxter's decision, as did serious doubts
about both the merits of the government's case and the relief requested. Mr. Baxter clearly had a very different approach to section
2 relief than that which was common when the case was brought in
the 1960s. Baxter's view was that injunctive relief (or divestiture)
had to be tailored with reasonable precision to the defendant's improper activities. By good luck, he was able to announce his historic settlement of the AT&T case on the same day and hence was
able to avoid what would otherwise have been a deafening, albeit
unwarranted, chorus of political abuse about abandoning IBM.
Baxter's memorandum to the Attorney General, 71 explaining
the IBM dismissal, rested essentially on five points: (1) Continued
Delay. "[U]nless the government loses the case at some earlier
point, it will be many years before the litigation ends." 7 2 (2) Dated
and Random Evidence. "It may well be that IBM is a monopolist and
controls some segment of the computer market .... The Government's case does not allege that IBM achieved that position illegally. Rather, the complaint alleges that IBM maintained a
monopoly position lawfully achieved through a series of illegal actions (bad acts) against its competitors . . .[W]hile several acts of
these [bad acts] have occurred in the manner and with the intent
alleged, the most persuasive episodes concern computer systems
that are not included in the market IBM is alleged to have monopolized." 73 (3) Appeal Prospects. "[W]hatever the chances that the Gov71 Memorandum from Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. "at the direction of Assistant Attorney General Baxter in his absence" to the Attorney General, dated January 6, 1982, and released by
the Department with a press release onJanuary 8, 1982. Copy on file with the Notre Dame
Law Review.
72 Id. at 2.
73 Id. at 3.
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ernment will prevail at trial, the likelihood of success on appeal is
small" 74 given the Second Circuit's recent decision in Berkey Photo,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. 7 5 (4) Injunctive Relief. "[T]here is no assurance that appropriate relief could be obtained. . . . The conduct

episodes that appear most promising as a potential basis for liability
are time-bound and highly specific to the immediate context in
which they occurred. It is impossible to fashion injunctions to prevent similar future violations that are neither so specific that they
would be meaningless outside those now-extinct circumstances, nor
so general that they would simply echo the language of the antitrust
laws themselves .
"..."76(5) Structural Relief. "Structural relief in this
case would be totally disproportionate to the nature and scope of
the violations that we might be able to prove. Further, despite
years of effort, no structural relief proposal has been identified that
would inject new competition into the industry while retaining the
77
efficiencies necessary to create viable successor companies."
Mr. Baxter's decision was clearly the right one in 1982.78 The

IBM case was forged in the Alcoa mold. IBM was a dominant competitor, with a superb sales organization, that had used a variety of
aggressive selling tactics to make life more difficult for its competitors in a vital and growing industry. For the Antitrust Division, the
IBM case might still have made some sense if it had been filed a
couple of years earlier and decided in the early 1970s-before the
79
computer market and the law had changed so drastically.
By the early 1980s, relief in IBM was an insurmountable problem. "Equity does nothing in vain," says the old maxim. Nobody
could imagine any relief, short of divestiture, that was in any way
connected to whatever IBM had done in the 1960s, and by 1982
this relief was simply too drastic on the proven facts to be acceptable in most political and economic circles.
C. United States v. AT&T Co. (1974-1982)80
AT&T was a case very different from IBM and was tried with a
74 Id.
75 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See note 49 supra and
accompanying text.
76 Memorandum, supra note 71, at 4.
77 Id. at 6.
78 The fact that Mr. Baxter's Democratic predecessor, Sanford Litvack, apparently
reached more or less the same conclusion over a year earlier lends additional support to
this conclusion.
79 Even then, the relief questions would have been difficult, but there was a greater
willingness to accept divestiture as a more or less automatic remedy for over-aggressive
monopolists.
80 Civ. Act. No. 74-1648 (D.D.C.). The government's complaint, filed November 20,
1974, is substantially reprinted in T. MORGAN, ECONOMic REGULATION OF BusINEss 818-25

(1976).
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very different sense of dispatch. AT&T turned much more centrally
on the structure of its industry. The ultimate question was whether
telecommunications was going to be a vast end-to-end monopoly
dominated by a single company-AT&T; or, whether long-distance
services and equipment manufacturing and supply could be broken
off or at least opened up to competition, while leaving the natural
monopoly parts of the business subject to full utility regulation.
The AT&T case should be analyzed as an integral part (and
perhaps the culmination) of a decade-long campaign by the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) and the Antitrust Division to
open key parts of the communications business to competition. 8 1
By the mid-1960s, the telephone business had long since become a
classic monopoly. Virtually all interstate voice communication was
provided by AT&T's Long Lines Division, while AT&T's local operating (Bell) companies served more than 80% of the country's
telephones. Meanwhile, nearly all of the equipment used by Long
Lines and the Bell operating companies came from AT&T's monopoly supplier, Western Electric, which was not subject to direct
regulation of its costs. Customers also had to lease all telephone
equipment from their local telephone company.
By the late 1960s, everything had begun to change. The FCC
began a process of piecemeal deregulation, with the active participation of the Antitrust Division in almost every important case.
82
The first vital break came in 1968, when in its Carterfone decision,
the FCC struck down the telephone companies' historic "foreign
attachment" tariffs and opened the door-at first just a crack-to
customers procuring their own communications equipment on a
competitive basis. A year later, the Commission opened the door
to competition in long-distance communications by allowing a then
unknown competitor (Microwave Communications, Inc.) to establish a microwave system between Chicago and St. Louis in direct
competition with AT&T. 83 This was followed in the early 1970s
with a series of decisions involving applications by microwave and
satellite carriers that were authorized to compete across the country
with AT&T in providing service between major metropolitan
81 I was deputy assistant attorney general, responsible for supervising the Antitrust Division's activities in the regulated sector at the time the AT&T case was filed. I discussed
the case and its relationship to other Antitrust Division and FCC activities in a speech entitled "Competition, Antitrust Communications, and Change," given before the Federal
Communications Bar Association in Washington on Jan. 17, 1975. Copy on file with the
Notre Dame Law Review.
82 In re Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, recon, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). The
London Economist recently labeled this decision "the Magna Carta of the information
revolution." The Sound of Breaking Monopoly, The Economist, August 22, 1981, at 15.
83 In re Applications of Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969).
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centers.84
Of course, neither the FCC nor the Antitrust Division could
come up with a competitive solution to the monopoly aspect of the
telephone system-the local telephone operating company. The
heavy investment in wires, poles, and local switches made a local
telephone system a classic "natural monopoly"-an enterprise in
which the economies of scale are so overwhelming that competition
cannot work in a technical sense. The Antitrust Division was profoundly concerned that the FCC's pioneering work would be
largely undone, that AT&T would be able to use its control of the
local monopoly networks to stifle competition in telephone equipment and long-distance communications.8 5 There was also a general concern that a local telephone monopoly had inadequate
incentives to "shop around" seriously for alternative equipment
sources to Western Electric.
These were the problems with which the Antitrust Division had
to deal in its front-page antitrust case in November 1974. The government's complaint alleged that AT&T had monopolized two
broad markets-"telecommunications service" and "telecommunications equipment"-by a variety of unfriendly devices.8 6 These included (1) refusing to provide interconnection to local networks for
long-distance and satellite carriers, (2) obstructing connection of
customer-provided terminal equipment, (3) enforcing a lease-only
policy on Bell System-provided terminal equipment, and (4) causing the Bell System "to purchase substantially all of its telecommu87
nications equipment requirements from Western Electric."
The government's prayer for relief focused particularly on
Western Electric. It sought complete divestiture of Western from
AT&T and further break-up of Western itself.8 8 The prayer also

sought "through divestiture ... to separate some or all of the Long
Lines Department of AT&T from some or all of the Bell Operating
84 Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), afd sub norn., Washington Utils. and Transp. Comm'n v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
836 (1975); Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities, 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972). In
1971, the Commission decided that a wide range of computer-communication services
could be offered on an unregulated basis. In re Computer Use of Communications Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), aff'dinpart, rev"d in part sub noi., GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474
F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). In 1956, the FCC decided that data processing services would not
be regulated under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, and that communications
carriers could offer data processing through separate segregated subsidiaries-a course not
open to AT&T because of the consent- decree in United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956
Trade Cas. (CCH) 7 68, 246 (D.N.J. 1956).
85 The new microwave and satellite carriers needed to access their customers through
the local monopoly network; the post-Carteifone equipment suppliers had to have access to
the technical specifications of the local monopoly telephone companies.
86 Complaint 77 27-30.
87 Id. at 7 28.
88 Complaint, prayer $ 3, 4.
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Companies." 8 9
In AT&T, the Antitrust Division faced an initial burden of establishing that AT&T's conduct was not exempt from the antitrust
laws by virtue of FCC regulation. In fact, the FCC generally supported the Division's assertion of antitrust jurisdiction and, with
this help, the government was able to defeat preliminary jurisdictional motions. 90 The case then moved forward with reasonable
dispatch, especially after it had been reassigned to Judge Harold
Greene upon the death of the initial trial judge. The trial actually
began in January of 1981, the government's case in chief was complete by July, and by mid-September the trial judge had ruled comprehensively against AT&T's motion for dismissal at the close of
the government's case. 9 1 This careful opinion (spanning over fifty
pages in the Federal Supplement) was obviously an important event
and must have contributed to the settlement process. Basically,
Judge Greene found that the government had proven its case on its
main theories:
The Court concludes that the evidence sustains the allegation that defendants have used their local exchange monopolies
to foreclose competition in the terminal equipment market by
refusing unreasonably to interconnect equipment not provided
by the Bell System, or by unreasonably impeding such
interconnection .... 92

The Court finds that, as of now, sufficient evidence has been
adduced to dictate the conclusion that AT&T has monopolized
the intercity services market by frustrating the efforts of other
compete with it in that market on a fair and reacompanies to 93
sonable basis.
The government has shown (and defendants concede) that
AT&T and its subsidiaries now discriminate between Long
89 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). The government's assumption in 1974 was that AT&T
would go on operating the local telephone companies, but that it would be forced to give
up all or most of its Western Electric holdings and at least some of its Long Lines
Department.
90 See Memorandum of FCC as amicus curiae in United States v. AT&T Co., reprintedin
62 F.C.C.2d 1102 (1977); and the district court's decision, 427 F. Supp. 57 (D.D.C. 1976).
This decision was broadly consistent with decisions in other cases. See Baker & Baker, supra
note 25, at 10-12.
91 United States v. AT&T Co., 524 F. Supp. 1336 (D.D.C. 1981). As Judge Greene
described it in his opinion:
[F]ollowing a period of intensive pretrial activity, trial was begun on January 15,
1981, and the first witness was called on March 4, 1981. The presentation of evidence on behalf of the government spanned a period of four months, and it included the examination of close to one hundred witnesses and the introduction of
thousands of documents and additional thousands of stipulations.
Id. at 1342 (footnotes omitted).
92 Id. at 1352.
93 Id. at 1357.
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Lines and non-Bell carriers with regard to access to Bell System
facilities. It has also
shown this discrimination to be anticompe94
titive in its effect.
[T]he Court holds that oft this record a showing has been made
which, unless it is rebutted, would support the conclusion that
defendants have engaged in anticompetitive conduct in their
procurement practices, in violation of law. 9 5
The government made its prima facie case by establishing that
fundamental business patterns (not random evidentiary fragments)
related to the structure of the defendant and had persisted over a
long period of time. The government was no doubt helped by the
massive, virtually public record that was available to it in connection with many FCC proceedings and by the fact that there was
96
broad sympathy between the two agencies.
The settlement which Assistant Attorney General Baxter and
AT&T Chairman Charles Brown announced on January 8, 1982
was very responsive to both the Antitrust Division's original goals
and what the government proved in its case in chief. The celebrated decree separated the natural monopoly local telephone
companies from the newly competitive parts of the business-including equipment supply and long-distance transmission. The
Justice Department and AT&T agreed that the Bell operating companies would be confined essentially to local monopoly service regulated by state utility commissions. This suited the Justice
Department's goals because it eliminated the Bell companies' incentive to favor one long-distance or equipment supplier over competitors. It suited AT&T because it did not want future offspring
(the Bell operating companies) to compete with AT&T in providing
long-distance service or terminal equipment to customers. What is
so interesting, and so contrary to the original assumptions of the
Antitrust Division, is that AT&T opted for the "competitive" side
of the business and was prepared to divest itself of the much larger
local telephone operations.
The decree was ultimately entered in the so-called Modification of Final Judgment (MFJ), and its entry was summarily affirmed
by the Supreme Court. 9 7 The MFJ created a process of ongoing
and continuing surveillance over AT&T and the Bell operating
94 Id. at 1361.
95 Id. at 1372.
96 The Chief of the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau during the years 1979-1981 was the
same lawyer, Philip L. Verveer, who had initially been the chief trial lawyer for the Antitrust
Division in the AT&T investigation (1974-1977).
97 Modification of Final Judgment, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,900 (D.D.C. 1982),
entry aff'd without opinion, Illinois v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). ChiefJustice Burger, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White dissented from the decision to affirm without a
hearing. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
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companies in the district court. Thus, Judge Greene has had to
make important decisions on exactly what lines of business will be
permitted to be Bell operating companies and whether they will be
authorized to make certain acquisitions and carry on other activities. The net result places the court in a sort of dual regulatory
jurisdiction with the FCC over the companies.9 8
The resolution of the AT&T case was a major triumph for the
Antitrust Division staff who had tried it energetically over its six
year life; and, perhaps even more, it was a personal triumph for
Assistant Attorney General William Baxter who had fought hard to
avoid an internal administration effort to have the case dismissed in
mid-summer 1981. His cool analytic approach helped fashion a decree which was, unlike so many other government decrees, clear
and analytic. It accomplished precisely what the government had
set out to accomplish, and indeed accomplished it to an even
greater degree than we who filed the case in 1974 could have reasonably hoped.
Whether the Antitrust Division's success in AT&T turns out to
be a political success is now very much in the hands of the state and
federal regulators who are being forced-painfully-to squeeze out
most of the traditional cross subsidies in the telephone business in
order to protect (1) the local operating companies from bypass of
their system, and (2) AT&T from having to bear disproportionately
heavy burdens in the new competitive world. This process is making certain long-hidden costs much more explicit, particularly those
costs associated with local telephone service, and this in turn is producing a substantial political backlash from the public at large.
Whether that backlash will settle down is still a very open question
in late 1986.
IV.

The Justice Department's Modern "Bad Conduct" Cases
Under Section 2

Section 2 "bad conduct" cases tend to be substantially smaller
and less notorious than government structural monopolization
cases. Moreover, a "bad conduct" case can have a more positive
effect if it results in a workable rule regulating the conduct of domi98 Senator Dole, apparently at the behest of the Reagan Administration, introduced
legislation (S. 2565) in mid-1986 to change this situation. The Dole bill would have transferred responsibility for administering the MFJ from the district court to the FCC. It was
supported by not only the Administration but the Bell operating companies, which believe
that Judge Greene has been too restrictive in authorizing them to go into "competitive"
services. It was opposed by AT&T, MCI, and others who fear that they will be disadvantaged if the Bell operating companies are permitted to mix "monopoly" and "competitive"
services. I anticipate that some version of the Dole bill will be reintroduced in early 1987.
Its chances of passage are far from certain in the new Congress.
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nant, or near dominant, enterprises in a particular industry (or the
economy generally). Basically, the "bad conduct" cases fall into
two varieties. The first might be called "abuse of dominant position" by a natural (or very efficient) monopolist. The basic relief
sought in such a case is an injunction specifically designed to curb
the particular conduct. Otter Tail99 (brought by the Justice Department in 1968) illustrates well the principles involved. The second
type might be called "attempted cartelization" by a market leader
in a competitive market. The Justice Department's Empire Gas 10 0
and American Airlines 101 cases (brought in 1972 and 1982, respectively) illustrate this category.
A.

Abuse of Dominate Position by a Natural Monopolist: Otter Tail
02
Power Co. v. United States

Otter Tail was a regional power company which provided retail
electric service to some 465 mostly-small towns in Minnesota,
North Dakota, and South Dakota. It had an effective monopoly
over transmission electric power in the region and was also by far
the largest source of generated electric power in the region. The
essence of the government's complaint was that Otter Tail sought
to use its transmission monopoly and generation dominance to prevent local communities from switching from Otter Tail service to
municipal distribution upon expiration of existing franchises.
In furtherance of this scheme, Otter Tail was found to have
refused to sell wholesale power to several towns which had
switched from Otter Tail franchises and to have refused to "wheel"
power across its transmission system from other sources to such
towns. l0 3 It also, according to the district court, engaged in baseless litigation designed to deter such franchise transfers. Based on
a record accumulated during a month-long trial, the district court
in Minnesota found that Otter Tail violated the antitrust laws by
these activities, and it entered injunctions against Otter Tail's refusals to sell wholesale power and to "wheel" power across its

system. 104
Otter Tail stoutly maintained that it was exempt from the antitrust laws by virtue of a Federal Power Commission regulation (a
position that the Commission supported in its amicus curiae brief in
99 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
100 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
101 United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed,
106 S. Ct. 420 (1985).
102 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
103 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971).
104 Id. at 61, 65.
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the Supreme Court0 5), but a closely divided Supreme Court held
that there was no such implied immunity. 106 The Supreme Court
sustained the findings on liability, except that it remanded the
"sham litigation" finding for further consideration in light of the
then recent CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited107 decision. The government ultimately prevailed on the "sham litigation" point on remand.
An interesting aspect of the Otter Tail litigation was that the
courts tried to make the relief dovetail with the jurisdiction of the
Federal Power Commission. In other words, while Otter Tail established that a dominant integrated utility could not refuse to deal or
to "wheel" with a local municipal system, the courts tried to avoid
having to decide the exact terms on which power could be sold or
wheeling services offered. Rather, the courts left this issue to the
Federal Power Commission, perhaps on a theory which is fairly
close to "primary jurisdiction." In other words, the court administering the Otter Tail decree might have the ultimate right to set
these terms, but it would not do so except in the most extreme situations. In fact, it appears that such an extreme situation never came
to pass. Instead, Otter Tail has become an important part of the
antitrust jurisprudence governing the electric power industry and,
more broadly, other regulated natural monopolies or near mono8
polies.10
Otter Tail directed everyone's attention to specific practices in
the electric power industry. It was followed by a good deal of private litigation against particular industry practices 109 as well as antitrust proceedings before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for
nuclear generating licenses. More broadly, Otter Tail reinforced the
existing law that a legitimate monopolist cannot refuse to deal with
an actual or potential competitor in order to maintain its position." 0 Nor can a firm which controls access to an essential facility
unreasonably deny others access to it."' These two rules seem to
be but two sides of the same coin.
105 Amicus curiae brief of the Federal Power Commission, Otter Tail Power Co. v.
United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
106 410 U.S. at 375. The vote was 4 to 3. Justices Blackmun and Powell took no part in
the consideration or decision of the case.
107 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
108 See notes 17, 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
109
110
111
dence

See ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS (Second) 132 n.145 (1983) (collecting cases).
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945); Gamco, Inc. v. ProviFruit & Produce Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
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Attempted Cartelization by a Leading Firm: United States v.
Empire Gas Corp. l l2 and United States v. American
Airlines, Inc.' 13

Each of these cases involved an attempt by a leading firm in a
market to coerce or persuade a significant competitor to raise its
prices. In each instance, there was no explicit agreement between
the defendant and any other competitor. Therefore, the government proceeded on an "attempted monopolization" theory. In
each case, the district court threw out the government's complaint." 14 In American Airlines, the government succeeded in getting
its complaint reinstated. 1 15 In Empire Gas, the government persuaded the court of appeals to accept its theory, but failed for lack
of proof of relevant market;1 6 moreover, the government's attempt
1 17
to obtain certiorari was denied.
The Empire Gas record has a real "bucaneering" quality. It
concerns competition for liquified petroleum (LP) gas sold in cylinders to customers in small Missouri towns and villages. The business was fairly localized and the sellers were mostly small
enterprises which purchased LP gas at a local plant and then distributed it on a local basis. The defendant, Empire Gas, competed
in a fairly broad range of towns and in fact had bulk LP gas plants in
some twenty-four states. Its history was apparently one of rapid
8
growth by acquisition and aggressive tactics."
The government's case concerned the defendant's efforts to
prevent small local competitors from reducing prices or soliciting
Empire Gas customers. Thus, witnesses described Empire Gas as
having said it was "too large to compete with" and that it "could
put [a particular competitor] out of business." ' " 9 In one instance,
Empire's president called a competitor and told him that he should
raise his prices. When the latter refused, the Empire president said
he was going to put the competitor out of business. In another instance, an Empire Gas district manager and plant manager called
on a local competitor and said the price for LP gas in the area was
going to be "either 9.5 or 15.9" cents per unit. 120 Since the competitor could not survive at 9.5 cents (which was a little below what
it had been charging), he eventually raised his price to 15.9 cents.
112 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
113 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985).
114 Empire Gas, 393 F. Supp. 903, 915 (W.D. Mo. 1975); American Airlines, 570 F. Supp.
654, 663 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
115 743 F.2d at 1122.
116 537 F.2d at 308.
117 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
118 See 393 F. Supp. at 905-08.
119 537 F.2d at 299-300.
120 Id. at 300.
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Still another Empire manager "demanded that [a local competitor]
come up two cents or Empire was going to play 'burnout' with
him." 21 When the latter declined to do so, Empire established a
town and solicited customnew subsidiary in the small competitor's
122
ers at half the prevailing price level.
Surprisingly, the district court found that the government had
"failed to prove that 'Empire entered into and attempted to enter
into price fixing agreements with LP gas distributors to increase LP
23
gas prices,' as alleged in . . . plaintiff's amended complaint."'

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed:
In the majority of these instances Empire's drastic price cuts followed express threats by its officers and employees that such
price cuts would result unless there was cooperation with defendant's plans [on price increases and non-solicitation of customers]. In the face of these express declarations of intent,
related by so many of the government's witnesses, we cannot
price cutting
accept the district court's conclusion that Empire's
124
was done for innocent competitive reasons.
Unfortunately for the government, it then proceeded to lose
the case on the ground that it had not established "dangerous
probability of success" in the context of a relevant geographical
market. 125 Apparently the government was just not prepared to
prove particular local geographic markets in the conventional way
used in merger cases. It relied very heavily on an internal Empire
Gas report which mentioned thirteen different geographic areas,
some of which were contiguous to each other and some of which
were not. The Antitrust Division finally suggested two areas (Lebanon and Wheaton) which the court of appeals found "considerably
smaller in area than a circle with a 20-mile radius"126-the distance
which testimony had established it was efficient to distribute LP
gas. 127 It conducted an informal survey which showed that Empire
Gas had almost half the market shares in these two communities,
but the court of appeals described its "reliability" as extremely
doubtful.' 28
When it sought certiorari in the Supreme Court, the Justice
Department argued that section 2 did not require this kind of precise market definition for the clearly reprehensible conduct shown
121 Id.
122 Id. at 301.
123 393 F. Supp. at 907.
124 537 F.2d at 301.
125 Id. at 306-07.
126 Id. at 304.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 304-05.
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in Empire Gas. 129 The Solicitor General's petition distinguished between unequivocally anticompetitive acts and ambiguous acts which
may be anticompetitive. It argued that when a defendant's conduct
is not obviously anticompetitive-that is, when it might promote efficiency and competition under some circumstances, restrain competition under others, or be competitively neutral in others-it is
necessary to carefully examine the effect on the market conditions
in which it takes place. 130 On the other hand, where the defendant's conduct has no redeeming competitive virtue-that is, when
the conduct never serves any purpose other than to control a competitor's prices or exclude competition-the government argued
that the conduct itself creates a danger of monopolization and demonstrates the actor's intent to violate the law.13 1 In such cases, the
government continued, there was no need for courts to engage in
refined analysis to determine how close the defendant actually was
32
to obtaining the power to control prices or exclude competition.
Suffice it to say, the Supreme Court either did not buy the theory or
did not accept it as a serious question. The Court's unwillingness
to speak on the issue in 1977 (when it was probably more pro-antitrust than today) may prove to be one of the more significant moments in the history of section 2.
United States v. American Airlines, Inc.133 is also a picturesque

case, but a more narrowly-focused one. The Justice Department
sought to establish the principle that, where a leading competitor in
a market proposes a price fix (or other cartel activity) to another
leading competitor in the market, the proposer should be held liable under section 2 on an attempt to monopolize theory. The
whole case turned on a single telephone conversation between the
presidents of American Airlines and Braniff Airways concerning
pricing and competition on flights from Dallas-Forth Worth International Airport (DFW). American and Braniff each had its major
hub at DFW. Together, their flights accounted for over 90% of the
passengers on nonstop flights between DFW and eight major cities.
Overall, "American and Braniff accounted for seventy-six percent
of monthly emplanements at DFW."' 134
The celebrated telephone call of February 1982 was between
Robert Crandall, president of American, and Howard Putnam, his
counterpart at Braniff. Putnam recorded the telephone call and af129
130
131
132
133
134

Petition for certiorari in United States v. Empire Gas Corp., No. 76-726 (1976), at 6.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 13.
Id.
743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985).
743 F.2dat 1116.
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terwards gave the tape to the Justice Department. The telephone
call, as excerpted by the court of appeals, went as follows:
Crandall: I think it's dumb as hell for ... sake, all right, to sit
here and pound the * * * * out of each other and neither one of
us making a * * dime.

Putnam: WellCrandall: I mean, you know..,

what the

****

is the point of

it?
Putnam: Nobody asked American to serve Harlingen. Nobody
asked American to serve Kansas City, and there were low fares
in there, you know, before. SoCrandall: You better believe it, Howard. But, you, you, you
know, the complex is here-ain't gonna change a... thing, all
right. We can, we can both live here and there ain't no room for
Delta. But there's, ah, no reason that I can see, all right, to put
both companies out of business.
Putnam: But if you're going to overlay every route of American's on top of over, on top of every route that Braniff has-I
can't just sit here and allow you to bury us without giving our
best effort.
Crandall: Oh sure, but Eastern and Delta do the same thing in
Atlanta and have for years.
Putnam: Do you have a suggestion for me?
Crandall: Yes. I have a suggestion for you. Raise your.., fares
twenty percent. I'll raise mine the next morning.
Putnam: Robert, weCrandall: You'll make more money and I will too.
Putnam: We can't talk about pricing.
Crandall: Oh bull * * * *, Howard.
We can talk about any...
135

thing we want to talk about.

Braniff never accepted Crandall's offer. The government's civil
complaint sought injunctive relief, including an injunction which
would bar American from employing Crandall for a period of
twenty-four months. 13 6 The district judge dismissed the complaint.' 3 7 The question posed was a narrow one: "[C]an an attempted joint monopolization claim be maintained without an
allegation of an agreement or conspiracy between the potential monopolists?" 38 Judge Hill answered the question emphatically
"no," based primarily on language in the American Tobacco decision.' 3 9 Instead, the judge found that Crandall's language constituted "only a solicitation to raise prices," and that this was not
sufficient to constitute an attempt. 4 0 The opinion also reviewed at
135 Id.
136 This echoes the relief that DistrictJudge Wyzanski imposed in Grinnell, but which the
Justice Department did not support in the Supreme Court. See note 64 supra.
137 United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 570 F. Supp. 654, 656 (1983).

138 Id. at 657.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 659.
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great length a variety of ancient common law cases on the issue of
whether solicitation and attempt could be charged to the same
conduct. 141
The court of appeals reversed. It said that the offense of attempted monopolization has two elements: (1) specific intent to accomplish the illegal result, and (2) a dangerous probability that the
attempt to monopolize will be successful. When evaluating the element of dangerous probability of success, the court did not rely on
hindsight but examined the probability of success at the time the
acts occurred. 14 2 It stressed that "[w]e see Crandall's alleged conduct as uniquely unequivocal in its potential, given the alleged market conditions as being uniquely consequential."' 143 It then
reviewed the old common law cases on whether "an attempt required more than a mere solicitation" and concluded that "there
14 4
was no clear consensus among the pre-1890 cases on the issue."'
The court stated that in enacting the Sherman Act, "Congress
could not have supposed that a solicitation could never be an attempt."' 4 5 The court was driven to this conclusion by its concern
that under appellees' construction of the Act, an individual is given
a strong incentive to propose the formation of cartels. "If the proposal is accepted, monopoly power is achieved; if the proposal is
declined, no antitrust liability attaches. If section 2 liability attaches
to conduct such as that alleged against Crandall, naked proposals
for the formation of cartels are discouraged and competition is
14 6
promoted."
After the reversal, the parties settled the case in a consent decree which exhibited price information exchanges and required
Crandall to keep detailed logs of conversations and telephone
calls.147 This was an important triumph for the government; with
particularly attractive evidence, it was able to establish the proposition that solicitation of cartel activity by a dominant or near dominant firm violated section 2. This was a civil case, but a future
prosecution of this type need not be. Given the reprehensible character of the conduct, the government would be entitled to proceed
148
criminally in a future case with equally strong evidence.
American Airlines established a large part of what the Justice Department sought unsuccessfully to establish in Empire Gas. The dif141 See id. at 660-63.
142 743 F.2d at 1118 (citations omitted).
143 Id. at 1119.
144 Id. at 1120.
145 Id. at 1121.
146 Id. at 1122 (footnote omitted).
147 1985-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 66,866.
148 See Baker, To hIdict or Not to Indict: ProsecutorialDiscretion in Sherman Act Enforcement, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 405 (1978).
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ference between what the Fifth Circuit held in American Airlines and
what the government sought in its Empire Gas certiorari petition
concerns market power. Had the government prevailed in its Empire Gas argument that market power need not be established when
the conduct was clearly reprehensible, the only issue in American
Airlines would have been as to what had occurred. As it was, the
government did have to show American's market dominance in service from the DFW airport. That apparently did not prove difficult.
I have always thought that proof of market power unnecessarily
complicates an Empire Gas-American Airlines type of case. If the defendant solicits and/or pressures a reluctant competitor to raise
prices or allocate customers and the competitor ultimately gave in,
the defendant is guilty of a section 1 felony without any showing at
all of market power or market effect. It hence seems odd to require
market power when the solicitation and pressure is unambiguous
but unsuccessful. I have always thought that the government's position in the Empire Gas petition was sound, provided that the "no
proof of market power required" rule was limited to plainly reprehensible conduct. Obviously, it would have much potential for mischief. In any event, the issue is today a largely moot one, as
American Airlines may give the government all it needs in the most
serious attempted cartel cases.
V. The Future of Government Section 2 Enforcement
How much government section 2 enforcement can we expect
in the future? The answer is uncertain. Two key factors cut in opposite directions. On one hand, the antitrust agencies are inevitably mired in the politics of a long-run budget impasse; they cannot
reasonably anticipate having the level of resources which they enjoyed in the late 1970s. Section 2 structural cases tend to consume
agency resources on a massive scale, and hence are less likely to be
brought in a Gramm-Rudman world. Indeed, it is very hard even to
imagine that the Antitrust Division would simultaneously pursue
two cases on the IBM or AT&T scale in the late 1980s or the early
1990s.
On the other hand, the post-Reagan Administration may face
some significant political pressures for section 2 structural cases. A
basic purpose of section 2 is to undue a pattern of mergers and
acquisitions, as can be seen in cases stretching from Standard Oil in
1911 to Grinnell in 1966. During the period from the Brown Shoe 49
decision in 1962 until the advent of the Reagan Administration in
early 1981, the government agencies pursued a vigorous-some149

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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times too vigorous-antimerger policy, and significant horizontal
mergers among direct competitors virtually disappeared.
Since 1981, we have seen a good many horizontal mergersincluding large mergers of the type that not even the most bullish
antitrust counsel of the 1970s would have dared to dream. These
mergers have been justified-often quite correctly--on the ground
that supply-side flexibility, foreign competition, and production efficiency should be given more weight. They should. Nevertheless,
it is also virtually certain that, in at least a few industries, the current Administration's more permissive merger policy will prove to
have been a visible blunder. For example, a merger approval premised on strong foreign competition may not have been a wise decision if the foreign competition is "snuffed out" later by political
action (quotas, embargoes, etc.) or by very dramatic changes in exchange rates.
This is not to say that the present Administration is making
persistent errors in merger enforcement (as some of its political
critics have charged), but rather, that it is taking many more
chances on horizontal mergers than its predecessors did. Taking
some of those chances will likely prove to be clearly wrong, with distasteful monopoly consequences being paraded across the media in
at least a few cases. Such a situation could, and probably should,
put pressure on the post-Reagan Administration to bring at least a
few Grinnell-typecases, to break up some highly visible, but not necessarily very large, "monopolies" created by merger during the
Reagan presidency.
Another variable in the section 2 equation will be the public's
longer-run perception of the Bell System break-up. This is obviously a major event in American industrial history and it has "antitrust" written all over it. If the public (however wrongly) comes
away feeling that the whole thing was a major disaster, the resulting
political reaction may exact practical barriers to future section 2
cases requesting divestiture remedies.
What seems clear is that monopoly and monopolization cases
tend to be long-run phenomena. Politics, by contrast, tends to be
short-run in perspective, with the accepted wisdom on any point
ebbing and flowing. The chief antitrust enforcers have comparatively short terms, and the decision to bring a large or novel case
may be heavily influenced by short-run factors. This is simply to
say that a holder of visible monopoly power in a significant market
must face the practical reality of being challenged under section 2
when particular political and enforcement circumstances happen to
coincide. The resulting uncertainty cannot be very comforting.
The central purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote business efficiency and consumer welfare. Lurking in the antitrust mis-
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sion is the recurring risk that antitrust weapons will be usedperhaps inadvertently, perhaps intentionally-to curb efficiency in
the name of "competitive equality." When this happens, less efficient competitors may be better off, but costs and consumer welfare
suffer. We depend on the wisdom of the courts, and the discretion
of the public prosecutors, to assure that it does not happen too
often. Nowhere is this risk greater than in the monopoly area-for
here, by definition, government enforcers and judges are dealing
with proven market success.

